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I. INTRODUCTION
On the eve of 2001, Enron' CEO Kenneth Lay announced to his executives
that Enron would become the world's greatest company.2 While Mr. Lay was
publicly declaring Enron's triumphs, unbeknownst to most Enron employees,
accountants at the Houston headquarters were desperately trying to contain a
* J.D., McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, to be conferred May 2004; B.A., Political
Science, The American University, 2001.
1. See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: The Company Unravels; Enron Buffed Image to Shine
Even as It Rotted from Within, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at I (reporting on the accounting irregularities that
forced the Texas corporation to reconcile over $600 million previously stated as profits).
2. Id.
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financial disaster that would eventually consume the company.3 Just months
before Enron declared bankruptcy in December 2001, the company was widely
regarded as one of the most innovative, fastest growing, and best managed
businesses in the United States.4 Formed in 1985, Enron owned the first
nationwide natural gas and pipeline network, but eventually shifted its focus
away from natural gas to the unregulated energy trading markets.5 This change in
focus, widely regarded on Wall Street as a success, propelled Enron towards
annual revenues of $101 billion in 2000.6 However, everything began to crumble
by August 2001.'
Since mid-1999, Enron had been establishing a vast web of partnerships,
eventually allowing the company to reduce its financial risk by moving various
holdings into these partnerships.' Establishing partnerships is a common
financing technique used by large companies because it allows companies to sell
the holdings deposited into the partnerships to outside investors who are more
willing to assume the financial risks.9 However, it was later discovered that the
partnerships Enron established were improperly used as a means for making the
company seem far more profitable than it actually was.' ° These improper
accounting practices forced Enron to eliminate $600 million in previously
reported profits." Enron's stock plummeted as a result, forcing the company to
file for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.2
Not long after the fall of Enron, WorldCom, the nation's second largest long
distance telecommunications company, announced on June 25, 2002 that it had
overstated its earnings by more than $3.8 billion. 3 The fundamental problem that
3. Id.
4. See MARK JICKLING, THE ENRON COLLAPSE: AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL ISSUES, C.R.S. REP.
RS21135 (Feb. 4, 2002) (providing a general overview of various financial issues that need to be addressed in
order to avoid another disaster like the one Enron experienced).
5. See id. (reporting that Enron believed there was more money to be made in buying and selling
financial contracts linked to the value of energy than in actual ownership of physical assets).
6. See id. (pointing out that Enron's annual revenues only a decade earlier were $10 billion).
7. Id.
8. See Eichenwald, supra note I (discussing some of the partnerships set up by Enron that later caused
serious problems).
9. See id. (reporting that Enron had sold its stake in a Brazilian power project to one of its partnerships,
which it later bought back). Enron later sold to the same partnership a stake in future gains in one of its
technology investments. Id. This complex arrangement allowed Enron to report a "paper profit" on the deal. Id.
10. See id. (noting that many of the Enron partnerships had been formed for the sole purpose of erasing
the risk of future losses from the company's financial statements). However, Enron could only keep those losses
off the books if the partnerships remained financially healthy. Id. Most of the partnerships had been financed
with Enron stock, and because Enron's stock was reducing in value, it decreased the partnerships' ability to
cover the losses. Id.
I1. Id.
12. See JICKLING, supra note 4, at 2 (postulating that even if Congressional investigations had found no
wrongdoing by Enron, the quick and unanticipated collapse of a large corporation suggests a basic problem with
the U.S. system of securities regulation).
13. See BOB LYKE & MARK JICKLING, WORLDCOM: THE ACCOUNTING SCANDAL, I C.R.S. REP.
RS21253 (Oct. 11, 2002) (providing a summary of the events surrounding WorldCom's collapse). In
WorldCom's June 25th statement, the company admitted that it classified $3.8 billion in payments for line costs
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WorldCom faced was the vast oversupply in telecommunications capacity due to
overly optimistic projections of Internet growth. 4 WorldCom continued to
expand despite the end of the dot-com era and an economic recession. This
combination of factors increased the company's debt at a time when revenues
were steadily declining, 5 thus, creating an incredible incentive to hide losses
through bad accounting practices. 6 Yet, WorldCom's troubles continued and the
company filed for bankruptcy on July 21, 2002.7
The collapse of WorldCom illustrated that Enron was not simply an
anomaly 8 and that America needed corporate reform. The sudden and immediate
collapse of two corporate giants forced the U.S. Congress and President to
respond. On July 30, 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush signed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 9 ("Sarbanes-Oxley") into law. President Bush declared the piece of
legislation the "most far reaching overhaul of the nation's business practices
since the Great Depression."2° The Act restricts accounting firms from
performing a number of services for the companies they audit.2' The Act also
requires new disclosures for public companies as well as the officers and2
directors of those companies. For example, a company's executives must sign
off on the accuracy of the company's financial statements and certify that they
21have designed procedures to ensure the accuracy of the reports. Other issues
affected by the new legislation include securities fraud, criminal and civil
penalties for violating the securities laws, blackouts for insider trading of pension
fund shares, and protections for corporate whistleblowers. 24
International reaction to Sarbanes-Oxley has been less than favorable. Many
foreign companies and government officials have publicly voiced their opposition."25
as capital expenditures rather than current expenses. Id. at 2. Line costs are what WorldCom pays other
companies for using their communications networks. Id.
14. Id. at 1.
15. Id. at 4 (noting that WorldCom stock had fallen from $64.50 a share in mid-1999 to less than $2 a
share just prior to the June 25th announcement). After the announcement, the price per share dropped to just
pennies. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Mike Allen, Bush Signs Corporate Reforms into Law; President Says Era of 'False Profits' Is
Over, WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at A4 (reporting that Congress quickly and easily passed Sarbanes-Oxley
after the fall of WorldCom, responding to fears that the measure would not be passed after the collapse of
Enron).
19. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
20. See Allen, supra note 18 (reporting the President's concern that corporate fraud has undermined
investor confidence).
21. See LYKE & JICKUNG, supra note 13, at 7 (summarizing the purposes of Sarbanes-Oxley).
22. Id.
23. See generally infra Part I.B.1-2 (discussing the requirements of § 302 and the SEC rules).
24. LYKE & JICKLING, supra note 13, at 7.
25. See Julia Finch, U.S. Clean-Up Angers Hewitt: Law Designed to Prevent Another Enron Is Seen as
Threat to British Business, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 8, 2002, at 21 (interviewing UK Trade Secretary Patricia
Hewitt, who accepts the basic premise behind Sarbanes-Oxley and its necessity for restoring confidence in
investors). However, Ms. Hewitt argues that "little thought" was given to the international repercussions and
that "a number of general and partial exemptions are justified because of the stricter regulatory environment in
Britain." Id.
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Foreign companies are opposed to Sarbanes-Oxley because the Act imposes
increased disclosure requirements and criminal liability 6 that may be at odds with
their country's regulations. Over the past few months, Europe has channeled its
anger into a concentrated lobbying effort against the implementation of various
provisions of the Act's rules regarding foreign companies.2 In response, former
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Harvey Pitt told Europe's
business community that the United States would consider granting exemptions in
special circumstances where Sarbanes-Oxley conflicts with a foreign country's laws
or where there are comparable regulations in place. 29 However, Pitt did not issue the
broad exemptions that Europe had hoped for.0 Pitt recently resigned as SEC
chairman, leaving Europe guessing whether its lobbying efforts had been in vain.3 It
remains to be seen whether the new head of the SEC, William Donaldson,32 will
engage in a dialogue with the international business community and consider
granting exemptions.
Obtaining exemptions for foreign companies will most likely prove to be an
uphill battle. Following the collapse of Enron, the U.S. Congress resolved not to
allow corporate executives to escape liability for wrongdoing with the "I don't
know" excuse.: Public and investor outrage fueled the drive towards the
development of very specific certifications imposed on CEOs and CFOs.
34
However, the United States failed to address several key issues through
legislation and agency rulemaking. For example, what happens when a foreign
issuer's home jurisdiction's corporate governance rules and laws conflict or
overlap with U.S. rules? What would happen if a company or executive could be
26. Id.
27. See Mark Landler, Porsche Is Balking at U.S. Auditing Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2002, at WI
(reporting that German companies are especially upset with the law because they feel that they are "quite far
away from the U.S. system"). In addition, differences in the way European and American companies operate
contribute to Europe's dissatisfaction. Id. For example, many German companies utilize a two-tiered managerial
system, as opposed to a single executive. Id.
28. See Suzanne Kapner, S.E.C. Chief Promises to Cooperate with Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002,
at WI (describing the pressure the European community is putting on the SEC to accommodate its companies).
29. Id. (explaining that Harvey Pitt won praise among European policymakers when he promised to
cooperate with Europe on issues of new accounting measures and regulatory policies); see also Stephen Castle,
Pitt Reassures Europe on New Accounting Law, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 11, 2002, at 25 (reporting
Chairman Pitt's comment that a comprehensive approach by the European Union "would have enormous
bearing on whether and the extent" to which U.S. regulations would apply).
30. See Kapner, supra note 28 (mentioning that Chairman Pitt is prepared to implement Sarbanes-Oxley
to all companies consistent with its purpose).
31. See Gary Duncan, Europe Seeks Exemption on US Act, TIMES (London), Nov. 18, 2002, at 6 (noting
the uncertainty of promises for exemptions or compromise after the departure of Harvey Pitt from the SEC and
the transition to Republican control of Congress).
32. See Andrew Countryman, Donaldson Takes Reins at an SEC in Turmoil, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 2003,
at I (reporting that Donaldson is replacing Harvey Pitt after his resignation as SEC Chairman amid widespread
criticism for poor judgment).
33. See BRUCE C. BENNErI' & GRAHAM ROBINSON, EXECUTIVE CERTIFICATIONS 9, available at www.
cov.com/publications/31 I.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting
that former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling testified before a congressional committee that he was "not aware of any
inappropriate financial arrangements").
34. See id. at 10 (noting the SEC's general policy that it is the senior corporate official's duty to
securities holders to be involved in determining disclosure).
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criminally liable in both the United States and its own jurisdiction? From the
drafting of Sarbanes-Oxley to the SEC's rules, the United States has failed to
make concessions to foreign companies who must comply with their own
country's laws and rules regarding corporate governance. In the absence of a
global securities regulator, the United States should now consider granting
exemptions.
This Comment is designed to achieve three goals: first, to provide a basic
background of disclosure requirements for foreign private issuers; second, to
discuss the certification and compliance requirements found in section 302 of
Sarbanes-Oxley; and finally, to propose a new approach for granting exemptions
from certification. Specifically, this new approach will explore the potential
development of an Equivalence Test for granting exemptions from section 302 to
foreign private issuers. Part II of this Comment discusses the history of foreign
issuer disclosure and examines section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley. Furthermore, Part
III explains the problems that the United Kingdom and Germany have with
section 302. Part IV advocates a method the SEC should adopt for granting
exemptions to foreign issuers. Finally, this Comment concludes that adopting an
Equivalence Test to place the burden on the foreign private issuer to demonstrate
the need for an exemption would best comport with U.S. goals of protecting
investors and encouraging foreign offerings on the national stock exchanges.
II. FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS AND DISCLOSURE: A BACKGROUND
Securities reform first appeared in the United States in the years immediately
following the stock market crash of 1929." The United States was somewhat of a
latecomer in regulating securities, as many European countries already had
securities laws on the books." Surprisingly, it took an unprecedented stock
market crash and incredible investment losses to push the U.S. Congress toward
regulation.37 Congress responded by enacting the Securities Acts of 1933 and
1934.3' The Acts codified principles of broad disclosure by mandating that
companies disclose to investors all material facts regarding the financial
condition of the company.39 In the years following the passage of the Securities
Acts, critics questioned the need for mandated broad corporate disclosure when it
was already in a company's best interest to disclose all relevant documents.40
35. 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 166-67 (3d ed. 1989).
36. Id.
37. See id. at 167 (recognizing that one of the motivations for reform was to push the economy towards
recovery).
38. Id. at 172-77 (explaining that the securities acts are a combination of the post-war English
"Companies Act" and the "New York Martin Act").
39. Peter L. Cholakis, Company Disclosure of Earnings Projections: Should Individual Investors Be
Allowed into "The Ball Park?," 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 819, 825 (1999) (explaining that material facts are
those matters which an average prudent investor ought to reasonably be informed).
40. See I LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at 187-91 (arguing that some theorists believe mandatory
disclosure is unnecessary because of developments in financial theory and competition for investors). However,
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However, mounting evidence of corporate misconduct and concern for the
continued stability of the markets prompted the further development of disclosure
rules.4
A. The Development of SEC Disclosure Requirements for Foreign Private
Issuers
As foreign private issuers4' began to make offerings into the United States,
the SEC slowly recognized the need to provide them with a special disclosure
form. For several decades following the enactment of the Securities Acts, the
SEC did not provide a separate disclosure form taking into account any
differences between U.S. and foreign issuers' business practices because there
simply had not been enough foreign offerings into the U.S. markets to warrant
it.43 By the 1970s, however, offerings into the United States by foreign companies
had increased enough to necessitate a response by the SEC.44 The result was the
development of the Foreign Integrated Disclosure System whereby foreignS 41
issuers would be subjected to slightly different disclosure requirements. In
providing this alternative, the Commission performed a difficult balancing act.
On one hand, it had to balance the strong interest in allowing U.S. investors full
access to consistent and comprehensible information. On the other hand, there
was the equally important interest of encouraging offerings by foreign companies
into the United States. 6
As a result of its difficult balancing task, the SEC developed Form 20-F.47 Use
of this form allowed foreign issuers to prepare their financial statements in
accordance with the currency of the country where the company was organized or
these theorists have ignored the evidence of fraud or excessive compensation that prompted Congress to act in
1933, 1934, and 1964. Id.
41. See generally id. at 193-218 (explaining that evidence of misconduct by both large and small
companies required the SEC to expand disclosure requirements).
42. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276 n.41
(Sept. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270, 274).
A "foreign private issuer" is any foreign issuer (other than a foreign government) except an issuer
meeting the following conditions:
(I) More than 50% of the issuer's outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly
held of record by residents of the U.S.; and
(2) [T]he majority of the executive officers or directors are U.S. citizens or residents; or
more than 50% of the assets of the issuer are located in the U.S.; or the business of the
issuer is administered principally in the U.S.
Id.
43. 2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at 802.
44. Id. at 802.
45. Id. at 802-03.
46. See id. at 803 n.47 (explaining these interests in further detail). Most foreign issuers maintained
different methods of accounting, auditing, and traditional business practices. Id. The SEC understood that
considerations would have to be made to foreign issuers because of these differences. Id. In many cases, the
SEC accepted foreign issuers' registrations despite these variations. Id.
47. See id. at 805 (explaining that this form is available to any foreign private issuer registering under §
12 of the 1933 Act or filing an annual report under § 13(a) or § 15(d) of the 1934 Act). Those filing reports on
Form 20-F were required to furnish information provided in their home jurisdiction. Id. at 805 n.49.
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incorporated.48 In addition, foreign companies could prepare their financial
statements according to either generally accepted accounting principals
("GAAP")49 in the United States or alternative bodies of accounting principles,
provided a discussion of material variations was included. ° Furthermore, Form
20-F did not require any specific corporate officer to verify its contents. Instead,
the form only required a signature on behalf of the company." These specific
instances of treating foreign issuers differently illustrate that the SEC has
historically recognized a disparity between U.S. and foreign corporate practices
and has attempted to accommodate these differences while still providing for
strong investor protection. However, the deference to foreign practice was
undermined when the SEC published its final rules concerning the scope and
interpretation of section 302.
B. Sarbanes-Oxley Section 302 and Enhanced Disclosure: SEC Interpretation
Anticipating the political fallout from the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the
SEC quickly formulated a set of proposed rules reflecting the President's goal to
hold corporate executives accountable.52 The proposed rules, which have come to
be known as the "June Proposals," contain many of the same ideas and policy
statements as those found in section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley.53 For example, the
proposals state that the SEC wants executives to certify the accuracy of annual
reports, maintain a system of internal controls and procedures, and undertake a
review of the effectiveness of the procedures. These substantive requirements
were based on the principle that full and fair disclosure of all material aspects of
a corporation's business is the most effective means to assure investor protection
and accurate reporting.55
In addition, the proposals were used as a tool to improve investor confidence in
the marketplace.56 The SEC expressed concern that the real or perceived absence of
executive participation in the formulation and oversight of internal controls was
48. Id. at 806.
49. See BOB LYKE, AUDITING AND ITS REGULATORS: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AFTER ENRON 2, C.R.S.
REP. RS21120 (July 11, 2002) (describing GAAP as "the conventions, rules, and procedures that define
accepted financial accounting principles at a particular time"). These include "both broad guidelines as well as
detailed procedures." Id. GAAP standards are generally set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB); however, the SEC has the authority to establish accounting principles for the public companies. Id.
50. 2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at 807.
51. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,877,
41,882 (proposed June 20, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 249).
52. See id. at 41,877 (explaining that the rules were drawn in accordance with the President's remarks
requiring that corporate executives certify their reports).
53. See id. (explaining that the SEC wants executives to certify their reports and internal control
procedures).
54. See id. at 41,878-41,882 (laying out the proposed requirements of each certification).
55. Id. at 41,877.
56. Id.
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shattering investor confidence.17 Investors expect a company's management to
ensure all reports present a clear and accurate picture of the financial condition of
the business.58 However, the SEC questioned whether investors truly expect
accurate reports if corporate executives do not spend an adequate amount of time
reviewing and analyzing the internal procedures that generate the data they present
in their annual reports.59 In an effort to respond to these concerns, the SEC
proposed the certification and internal control provisions.
60
Despite announcing broad policy statements and new disclosure requirements,
the SEC specifically exempted foreign private issuers from the June Proposals. 61 The
SEC articulated several reasons for the exemptions. First, Form 20-F does not
require the signature of the CEO or CFO . However, the form must be signed on
behalf of the company, which generally results in the signature of the principle
executive officer.63 Second, unlike domestic companies, foreign private issuers
are not required to file a quarterly report. 64 However, they must file copies of all
information required under the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation. 6 Most
importantly, the SEC recognized that "mandatory requirements regarding internal
procedures raise several issues, since those requirements may be inconsistent
with the laws or practices of the foreign private issuer's home jurisdiction and
stock exchange requirements. "66 For these reasons, the SEC explained that
requiring foreign private issuers to comply with the new proposals would raise
issues that do not exist for domestic issuers." The specific exemption of foreign
issuers from the proposed rules implies that the Commission recognizes that
investor protection may be accomplished even with some accommodations for
foreign issuers.68
57. See id. (explaining that investor confidence is important, but executive participation may provide
additional assurance that any reporting is accurate).
58. See id. (noting some basic principles that maintain investor confidence in the markets).
59. See id. (questioning whether the traditional anti-fraud and disclosure rules are enough to ensure full
disclosure).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 41,882.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. (noting that domestic issuers are required to file quarterly reports on form 10-Q).
65. See id. at 41,882 n.67 (explaining that foreign issuers file the information on Form 6-K).
66. See id. at 41,882 (illustrating that the SEC was interested in soliciting comments from the public to
determine whether foreign private issuers should be subject to the disclosure requirements).
67. See id. (adding that the SEC would solicit comments on the issue of whether foreign private issuers
should be subjected to the new proposals).
68. See Letter from Todd M. Malan, Executive Director, Organization for International Investment
(OFII), to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities Exchange Commission (Aug. 19, 2002), at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/tmmalanl.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining that
the SEC has exempted foreign issuers from the quarterly reports, the proxy rules, and the insider reporting and
short swing profit recovery provisions of § 16 of the 1934 Securities Act). In addition, foreign issuers are not
required to disclose individual executive compensation. Id. The SEC has accepted some international
accounting standards and allowed U.S. exchanges to tailor special rules for foreign issuers. Id.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 16
However, with the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC proceeded to require
foreign issuers to comply with section 302. 9 According to the Commission, the
section, "by its terms," clearly applies to foreign issuers.70 On its face, section
302(a) appears to cover foreign issuers because it applies to companies filing
reports under sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act.7 However, when
read in light of section 302(b), section 302(a) appears to be designed to apply
69. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2003) (listing the specific statutory
requirements for compliance). Section 302 provides:
(a) The Commission shall, by rule, require for each company filing periodic reports under section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that the principal executive officer or
officers and the principal financial officer or officers, or persons performing similar functions,
certify in each annual or quarterly report filed or submitted under either such section of the
Act that-
(1) the signing officer has reviewed the report;
(2) based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading;
(3) based on such officer's knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in the report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, and for, the periods in the report;
(4) the signing officers-
(A) are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls;
(B) have designed such internal controls to ensure that material information relating to
the issuer and its consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such officers by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which the periodic reports are
being prepared;
(C) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer's internal controls as of a date within
90 days prior to the report; and
(D) have presented in the report their conclusions about the effectiveness of their
internal controls based on their evaluation as of that date;
(5) the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer's auditors and the audit committee of the
board of directors (or persons fulfilling the equivalent function)-
(A) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which
could adversely affect the issuer's ability to record, process, summarize, and report
financial data and have identified for the issuer's auditors any material weaknesses in
internal controls; and
(B) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the issuer's internal controls; and
(6) the signing officers have indicated in the report whether or not there were significant
changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of their evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.
(b) FOREIGN REINCORPORATIONS HAVE NO EFFECT--Nothing in this section
shall be interpreted or applied in any way to allow any issuer to lessen the legal force
of the statement required under this section 302, by an issuer having reincorporated or
having engaged in any other transaction that resulted in the transfer of the corporate
domicile or officers of the issuer from inside the United States to outside of the United
States.
(c) DEADLINE.--The rules required by subsection (a) of this section shall be effective
not later than 30 days after [July 30, 2002].
Id.
70. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,278 (Sept.
9, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270, 274).
71. Id.
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only to American companies.72 Section 302(b) states that re-incorporation or
moving of the corporate domicile from within the United States to another
jurisdiction would not preclude the operation of section 302(a).73 If section 302
applies to every issuer, both foreign and domestic, then it would have been
unnecessary for Congress to add section 302(b).74 Foreign issuers are already
incorporated and domiciled outside the United States, and the section 302(b) re-
incorporation provision has no practical affect on foreign issuers. However, the
Commission's new approach is a clear reversal of its position stated in the June
Proposals. Regardless of any ambiguity in the language of section 302, foreign
issuers must comply with the Commission's final rules implementing section
302.
1. Providing Guidance: The SEC Publishes Final Rules
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority, the SEC recently adopted Exchange Act
rules 13a-14 and 15d-14 5 to clarify what the term "fairly presents" means in
section 302(a)(3). The SEC also adopted rules 13a-15 and 15d-1516 which
introduced the concept of "disclosure controls and procedures" that modifies the
term "internal controls" in section 302(a)(4)(A). With the adoption of these rules,
the SEC was finally able to clarify section 302.
Viewed collectively, the rules clarify the meaning of fairly presents found in
section 302(a)(3).77 The executive must make a certification regarding the fair
presentation of "financial statements and other financial information. 78 The
commentary in the rule interprets financial statement and other financial
information to comprise all elements of a company's financial disclosure,
including financial statements, selected financial data, management discussion
and analysis, and any other financial information in the report.79 The SEC has
determined that fair presentation is not limited to a representation that the
financial statements and other financial information have been presented in
72. See id. (mandating in § 302(b) that re-incorporating in another jurisdiction would not allow a
company from circumventing the requirements of this section).
73. Id.
74. See Letter from Dr. Arnold Knechtle, Director, INDUSTRIE - HOLDING, to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, Securities Exchange Commission (Aug. 19, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/
aknechtlel.htm [hereinafter Knechtle Letter] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (arguing that if §
302(a) is read to apply equally to both foreign and domestic private issuers, there would be no reason for
Congress to include § 302(b) to prevent domestic issuers from circumventing the rules).
75. See Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. at 57,277
(stating that these are the rules requiring an issuer's CEO and CFO to certify the quarterly or annual reports
submitted under § 13(a) or § 15(d) of the Exchange Act). These rules embody § 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley. Id.
76. Id. at 57,279.
77. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2003).
78. See Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. at 57,279
(noting that a discussion of fair presentation was not included in the June Proposals).
79. Id.
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accordance with GAAP. Instead, the SEC concluded fairly presents is a concept
of material accuracy and reporting broader than what is required under GAAP. s
The move beyond GAAP was a victory for the SEC because the Commission has
previously indicated that a statement can be misleading despite being in strict
accordance with GAAP principles.8 2 Accordingly, a fair presentation of the
information encompasses judgments about the issuer's selection, proper
application of appropriate accounting polices, and disclosure of all financial• • 83
information. An issuer must also include any additional information that is
necessary to provide investors with a materially accurate and complete picture of
the issuer's financial condition. 4
Foreign issuers argue that the term fairly presents, as defined, could prove
problematic because the term reflects audit procedures and practices employed in
the United States and the certifying officer may be unsure whether the
information provided satisfies the section 302 certification requirement.85
However, the Commission makes it clear in the rule that the International
Accounting Standard speaks to the essential elements that must be considered
within the framework of GAAP in evaluating whether an issuer's financial
86statements fairly present its financial condition. In addition, it is unlikely that
compliance would be difficult in practice for foreign issuers because the term
fairly presents only requires, for example, additional statements of why certain
accounting principles were chosen and disclosure of certain financial information
to explain transactions or events. In this context, fairly presents takes on less
meaning than the interpretation the SEC has given it.
Equally important, the new rules interpret the requirement that the CEO and
CFO certify that they are responsible for maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures." Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15 call for an issuer to maintain
80. See id. at 57,279 (indicating that it was Congress' intent to include both income or loss and cash
flows within the concept of "fair presentation" of an issuer's results of operation).
81. See id. at 57,279 n.5 (explaining that presenting information in conformity with GAAP may not
necessarily satisfy the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws).
82. See BENNETT & ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 25-26, available at www.cov.com/publications/
31 l.pdf (citing In re Edison Schools, Inc., SEC Release No. 34-45925 (May 14, 2002) and U.S. v. Simon, 425
F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), where the financial statements were misleading despite being in accordance with
GAAP principles).
83. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. at 57,279.
84. Id.
85. See Letter from Linklaters, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities Exchange Commission (Aug.
19, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102linklaters I.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (copy on file
with The Transnational Lawyer) (arguing that the certification cannot be meaningfully applied to a company
that prepares its accounts in accordance with principles other than U.S. GAAP). According to the argument, the
only way to ensure that the statements satisfy § 302 is to require foreign issuers to comply with U.S. GAAP. Id.
But requiring foreign issuers to do so would be contrary to a long standing policy of allowing foreign issuers to
supply information according to local GAAP. Id.
86. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,278 (Sept.
9, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270, 274).
87. Id. at 57,277-57,278 (defining "disclosure controls and procedures" as "controls and other
procedures of an issuer that are designed to ensure that information required to be disclosed by the issuer under
the Exchange Act is recorded, processed, summarized and reported, within the time periods specified in the
Commission's rules and forms").
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commensurate procedures for gathering, analyzing, and disclosing all required
information." Disclosure controls and procedures apply only to the certification
required by section 302(a)(4) and were designed by the Commission to be
distinguishable from the concept of internal controls." The SEC adopted the
broader concept of disclosure controls and procedures to ensure compliance with
disclosure requirements generally because the concept is intended to address the
quality and timeliness of disclosure.9 By contrast, internal controls pertain only
to an issuer's financial information.' Specifically, internal controls make up a
process designed to achieve reliability in financial reporting, the effectiveness
and efficiency of operations, and compliance with applicable laws and
regulations." Foreign issuers must immediately take the appropriate steps in
order to effectively respond to these new rules. Failure to do so could subject the
issuer and its officers to potential civil liability even where the failure to respond
to the new rules does not lead to a flawed disclosure.93
2. Maintaining Effective Disclosure Controls and Procedures
Despite announcing the intended scope of disclosure controls and procedures,
the SEC did not mandate a formal structure for maintaining these procedures.
Rather, each issuer is expected to "develop a process that is consistent with its
business and internal management and supervisory practices."9 While each issuer
will have to develop a means for implementing and complying with these new
rules, such procedures and controls should incorporate the general principles of
verification, analysis, organization, education, and communication.95 However,
88. See id. at 57,281 (stating that these rules are intended to complement the existing requirements for
reporting companies to establish and maintain internal controls).
89. See id. at 57,279-57,280 (explaining that internal controls pertain to an issuer's financial reporting
and is addressed in § 302(a)(5)-(6) and § 404 of the Act).
90. Id. at 57,279.
91. Id. at 57,280.
92. Id.
93. See Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, Securities Update: Suggested Disclosure Controls and
Procedures, Sept. 25, 2002, at 1, available at www.mayerbrownrowe.com/publications/article.asp?id=260&nid
=6 (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting that even if an issuer's disclosures are appropriate,
failure to maintain adequate disclosure controls and procedures could expose the certifying officers to liability
for making a false certification). This could subject the company to SEC sanctions for failure to observe the
company's obligations under § 13(a) of the Exchange Act. Id.
94. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. at 57,280
(suggesting that "an issuer create a committee with responsibility for considering the materiality of information
and determining disclosure obligations on a timely basis").
95. See Michael L. Zuppone, Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Disclosure Controls and
Procedures and the Related CEO and CFO Certification-Analysis and Recommendations (Paul, Hastings,
Janofsky & Walker LLP ed., Oct. 2002), at http://www.paulhastings.com/ClientAlerts/Content/10-2%20Section
%20302%20of%2oSarbanes%200xley.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational
Lawyer) (suggesting several principles that should be adhered to when developing the disclosure controls and
procedures). The disclosure controls and procedures should be formally organized so that the persons
responsible are identified and their responsibilities are clear. Id. Participants must have knowledge of the SEC's
reporting requirements. Id. The information in the reports must be carefully reviewed and substantiated to
ensure that it reflects a reasonable interpretation of the facts. Id. In addition, there should be clear lines of
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the SEC does suggest that an issuer establish a disclosure committee that reports
directly to the certifying officer on the maintenance of these procedures. 9, Such a
committee should be formed for the purpose of designing and implementing the
issuer's disclosure controls and procedures.97 In addition, the committee wouldS 98
oversee the issuer's compliance with its disclosure obligations. The disclosure
committee must have a written compliance procedure detailing the company's
disclosure policies, each individual's specific responsibilities, and the
disciplinary procedures for participants who fail to perform their duties.99 This
procedure will assist in guaranteeing that information to be disclosed is recorded
and summarized on a timely basis.'00
Certifying officers need to make an effort to take an active role in the
disclosure process because they are the ones ultimately held accountable for flawed
disclosures and false certifications.10' To protect themselves, officers should
consistently inquire into the progress of their company's disclosure controls and
procedures and should meet with senior management to discuss the content of the
procedures employed.1re Furthermore, one cannot underscore the importance of
some basic principles such as starting early,' 3 preparing to adhere to a realistic
time schedule,'O°  documenting the process,'' and remaining aware of SEC
precedent.'O° The implementation of these suggestions and principles should
assist an issuer in complying with the requirements of section 302. However, a
foreign private issuer may find it difficult or burdensome to comply with the
communication to assure that only the information necessary for compliance is identified and there is clear
access to the information. Id.
96. See Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. at
57,280 (describing that the committee would be effective if it included the controller, general counsel, risk
management officer or other officers as members).
97. Zuppone, supra note 95, at http://www.paulhastings.com/ClientAlerts/Content/102%2OSection%
20302%20of%2OSarbanes%200xley.pdf.
98. See id. (explaining that the committee's members must have a collective understanding of the
issuer's business and strategic plan, financial results and condition, and operational, competitive and financial
risk profile). A subcommittee should also be established to address problems requiring immediate attention or
sensitive developments not otherwise known throughout the company. id.
99. See id. (noting that a written compliance procedure would only underscore the importance of the
disclosure controls and procedures).
100. See id. (suggesting that a disciplinary procedure will help ensure individuals are responsible for
their portions in the process).
101. See id. (discussing, generally, the suggested procedures for executive review of disclosure).
102. See id. (emphasizing that the certifying officers should make inquiries and ask a lot of questions). A
sample list of questions follows: who was involved in the drafting; how was the information recorded and
processed; are the participants comfortable with the procedures employed; what significant issuers arose; are the
statements consistent with the GAAP; were there any disagreements with outside auditors; are the participants
aware of any material misstatement or omission contained in the reports. Id.
103. See Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, supra note 93, at www.mayerbrownrowe.com/publications/
article.asp?id=260&nid=6 (suggesting that companies should begin to gather information before the end of the
fiscal year and constantly prepare narrative descriptions to be included in the final draft).
104. See id. (noting that the importance of establishing deadlines increases as the amount of people
involved in the process grows).
105. See id. (suggesting that records of meetings and procedures should be consistently kept).
106. See id. (stating that a company should be aware of its own prior disclosures and competitors'
disclosures to further enhance its own understanding of how their industry handles disclosure).
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enhanced disclosure requirements of section 302 if the issuer's laws and practices
are different from the type of procedures that are necessary to comply with
section 302 despite the recommendations.
Foreign issuers must also be aware that rules 13a-15 and 15d-15 require
companies to conduct an evaluation of the effectiveness of the design and the
operation of their disclosure controls and procedures within ninety days prior to
filing a report with the SEC.' ° The scope of the evaluation will vary, but at the
least, it should confirm that each individual's job was completed and that the
certifying officers consulted with outside advisors regarding any concerns or
suggestions. 'o8
C. Potential Consequences of Non-Compliance: Section 906 and Criminal
Liability
Despite the difficulties foreign issuers might face in complying with section
302, foreign issuers should take the required steps because the potential
consequences for failing to follow section 302 are serious. In an effort to
encourage compliance, Congress added section 906 as an amendment to the
federal criminal code.' ° Under section 906, a signing officer may be fined not
more than $1,000,000, imprisoned not more than ten years, or both if the officer
certifies a report "knowing" it is false.'"0 If the officer "willfully" certifies a
report knowing that the certification is false, the signing officer may be fined not
more than $5,000,000, imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."' Section
906 creates harsh criminal penalties where previous liability was limited to civil
damages. "
Similar to section 302, section 906 creates patent ambiguity because of
apparent drafting flaws. On its face, section 906 imposes a separate certification
requirement from section 302. Section 906 certifications apply to periodic
reports," 3 while section 302 certifications apply to annual or quarterly reports.1
4
107. See Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,281
(Sept. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270, 274) (noting that the evaluation
must be carried out in a manner that would form the basis for the certifications required to be made by §. 302).
108. See Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, supra note 93, at www.mayerbrownrowe.com/publications/
article.asp?id=260&nid=6 (suggesting that the certifying officers should confirm the agreed upon steps for
preparation). In addition, the officers should verify that each portion of the project was competently completed
and inquire whether any matter has come up after the last filed report. Id. Finally, they should ensure all
information was checked against the financial information. Id.
109. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002) (indicating that § 906 requires the
CEO and CFO to provide written statements which shall state that the periodic report fully complies with the
requirements of § 13(a) or § 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and the information fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the issuer).
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. See BENNET & ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 39, available at www.cov.com/publications/31 l.pdf
(noting that SEC filings have always been subject to potential criminal liability under the False Statements Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1036 (2003)). However, prosecutions under this Act have been uncommon and the
maximum imprisonment is far greater under § 906. Id.
113. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002) (referring only to periodic reports).
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Sarbanes-Oxley and the Securities Acts do not define a periodic report, but
securities practitioners generally refer to annual and quarterly reports as periodic
reports." 5 The SEC has failed to provide any guidance on this issue because
section 906 falls within the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice."6 However,
statements from members of Congress make it clear that their intent was to create
only one certification under section 302 and enforce its provisions with the harsh
criminal penalties provided under section 906. 7 Because Congress did not intend
to create two separate requirements, it is unclear whether a person may be
criminally liable for failing to comply with the non-financial reporting
requirements contained in section 302.
The plain language of both sections 302 and 906 provides guidance on the
issue. For example, section 906 requires the signing officer to certify that the
report fairly presents the financial condition and results of the issuer's
operations. " ' Section 302(a)(3) also requires the signing officer to certify that the
financial statements fairly present the financial condition and results of the
issuer's operations." 9 The parallel language suggests criminal liability will only
attach to the certification of financial information, not to non-financial
information found in the remaining portions of section 302.'20 In addition, it
appears unlikely Congress intended criminal liability to attach for false
certifications of non-financial information when various civil remedies are
already available." ' However, it will remain unclear whether criminal liability
attaches to the certification of non-financial statements under section 302 until
there is a definitive statement determining the scope of section 906.'22 Ultimately,
114. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2003) (noting that § 302(a) mentions
only quarterly and annual reports).
115. See BENNET & ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 21-22, available at www.cov.com/publications/
31 l.pdf (arguing that the distinction in language makes little difference because annual and quarterly reports
contain financial statements and, thus, come under the ambit of § 906).
116. See id. at 20 (noting that the SEC has taken the position that it does not have jurisdiction over §
906). However, the SEC and the Department of Justice determine whether the two sections can be harmonized.
Id.
117. See id. at 20-21 (stating that Senator Enzi made a statement on the Senate floor where he pointed
out that there is cause for confusion because the penalties under § 906 are effective upon the President's
signature, whereas the SEC has 30 days to promulgate rules under § 302). Senator Enzi expressed his view that
the penalties under § 906 should not take effect until the final § 302 rulemaking process had been completed.
Id.; see also Karen L. Werner, Technical Correction on Sarbanes-Oxley Needed on Certification Conflict, Oxley
Says, BANKING DAILY, Nov. 8, 2002 (reporting Representative Michael Oxley as stating he believes Congress
did not intend to create two separate certification requirements). Representative Oxley remarked that he hoped
this flaw could be corrected through an amendment to Sarbanes-Oxley or by cooperation between the SEC and
the Justice Department in administration of §§ 302 and 906. Id.
118. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906.
119. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302.
120. See generally Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed.
Reg. 57,276 (Sept. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270, 274) (affirming the
information to be certified under § 302(a)(4)-(6) is not a financial statement, but rather information relating to
internal operations and management).
121. See id. at 57,280 (explaining various liability provisions for false statements found in the Exchange
Act).
122. See BENNETT & ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 21-22, available at www.cov.com/publications/
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uncertainty in the application of and the integration between sections 302 and
906 may present problems for all issuers. Uncertainty will ultimately provide
foreign issuers with an incentive to be cautious and reflective concerning their
decision to enter or remain in U.S. markets.
II. THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT: SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE
FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUER
The United Kingdom and Germany are examples of two jurisdictions where
companies organized under and subject to their domestic laws may find
compliance with section 302 problematic. An examination of these countries'
securities laws illustrates how foreign laws overlap or conflict with a foreign
private issuer's obligations under section 302, forcing foreign issuers to re-evaluate
their business practices and responsibilities under the new rules. The potential cost
of compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley could prove quite burdensome for foreign
issuers because of the time and capital necessary to restructure procedures and
policies to reflect these new requirements. The United Kingdom and Germany
present two distinct scenarios to help understand the difficulty in applying
inconsistent securities laws and provide a context for advocating in favor of an
exemption policy.
A. United Kingdom: Corporate Governance and Section 302
The United Kingdom is a prime example of a jurisdiction where the laws and
the corporate governance codes virtually overlap with section 302. The corporate
governance codes in the United Kingdom place heavy emphasis on financial
reporting obligations."' The United Kingdom drafted both the Combined Code 24
31 l.pdf (noting that securities practitioners refer to quarterly and annual reports as periodic reports). The term
"periodic report" is not defined in Sarbanes-Oxley. Id. However, because the annual and quarterly reports
contain financial statements, they will most likely be subject to § 906. Id. It should be noted that the doubt
surrounding the application of § 906 does not relieve one of civil liability under § 302. Id. at 38. A § 302
certification is a "statement," and any materially false or misleading information may lead to liability under
Rule 1Ob-5 or under § 18 of the Exchange Act. Id. at 38.
123. Holly J. Gregory & Robert T. Simmelkjaer, Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes
Relevant to the European Union and Its Member States (Jan. 2002), at 68-69, available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/internalmarket/en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-rpt_en.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
124. See generally COMMlrITEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE COMBINED CODE (May 2000), available
at www.ecgi.de/codes.country-documents/uk/combinedcode.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer) (noting this corporate governace code brings together the recommendations from the earlier
Cadbury Report and Greenbury Reports).
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and the Turnbull Report' 5 out of concern for maintaining integrity in financial
reporting and boosting investor confidence.
The United Kingdom, like many other European jurisdictions, enforces
mandatory disclosure requirements by linking its corporate governance codes to
the stock exchange listing rules. 7 For example, companies listed on the London
Stock Exchange are required to take into consideration provisions of the
Combined Code.' The Code is composed of a list of corporate governanceS 129
principles and best practices. The London Stock Exchange rules require each
company to include in its annual report a narrative statement of how it applies the
principles set out in section 1 of the Combined Code with sufficient explanation
to enable shareholders to evaluate the extent to which those principles have been
applied.' 3 However, the London Stock Exchange operates under a "comply or
explain" basis. 3 ' Thus, in accordance with London Stock Exchange rule 12.43.A(b),
the company must state:
whether or not it has complied throughout the accounting period with the
Code provisions set out in Section 1 of the Combined Code. A company
that has not complied with the Code provisions, or complied with only
some of the Code provisions or complied for only part of an accounting
period, must specify the Code provisions with which it has not complied,
and where relevant, for what part of the period such non-compliance
continued and give reasons for any non-compliance."'
125. See INTERNAL CONTROL: GUIDANCE FOR DIRECTORS ON THE COMBINED CODE (Inst. of Chartered
Accountants in England & Wales ed., 1999), at www.ecgi.de/codes/countrydocuments/uk/turn bull.pdf
[hereinafter INTERNAL CONTROL] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (providing general guidelines
of how to comply with the Combined Code).
126. Gregory & Simmelkjaer, supra note 123, at 68-69, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal
_market/en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-rptsen.htm.
127. See id. at 69 (explaining that the stock exchanges have listing rules, which are requirements within
specific exchanges in order for a company to list its securities). Many of these exchanges require compliance
with codes of corporate governance as a means to enforce mandatory disclosure. Id.
128. Id.
129. See COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 124, available at www.ecgi.de/codes.
country-documents/uk/combinedcode.pdf (establishing basic principles of corporate governance).
130. Gregory & Simmelkjaer, supra note 123, at 69, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-
market/en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-rpt-en.htm; see also COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 124, available at www.ecgi.de/codes.country-documents/ uk/combinedcode.pdf
(explaining that § I lists the obligations of companies under the code). Section 2 reflects the responsibilities of
Institutional Shareholders. Id.
131. See Brian R. Cheffins, Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via
Toronto, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 5, 26 (1999) (stating that although the Combined Code does not have a
statutory backing, the rules are enforced as a continuing obligation of listing on the London Stock Exchange).
The United Kingdom made a decision not to rush into statutory requirements in the absence corporate scandals.
Id. at 27-28.
132. Gregory & Simmelkjaer, supra note 123, at 69-70, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm./internal-
market/en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-rpten.htm.
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The comply or explain principle was adopted as a means to encourage specific
corporate governance practices without mandating actual practices. 33 However,
most companies simply comply with the Combined Code's provisions in order to
avoid having to explain the variance."'
The Combined Code requires a company to maintain a system of internal
controls. Principle D.2 of the Combined Code declares that "the board should
maintain a sound system of internal control to safeguard shareholders'
investment and the company's assets.""' The Turnbull Report, which provides
guidance on how to comply with the Combined Code, suggests several key
reasons for maintaining an effective internal control system."' The report
explains that internal controls play a key role in managing business risks and
safeguarding shareholders investments.'37 A sound system helps ensure reliable
and timely compliance with laws and regulations as well as proper maintenance
of accounting records.'38
However, the SEC made a distinction between internal controls and
disclosure controls and procedures.'39 The SEC explained internal controls as
relating only to financial reporting, whereas disclosure controls and procedures
addresses quality and timeliness of disclosure.'4° The Turnbull Report implicitly
combines the aspects of disclosure controls and internal controls into its concept
of internal controls.' 4' The report characterizes the elements necessary for a sound
system of internal controls as ones that enhance the quality, timeliness, and
accuracy of financial reporting. For example, the Combined Code provides
such elements should include procedures for enhancing the maintenance of
records to facilitate timely reporting with applicable laws and improving
communication and information processes. 43 Thus, it appears that compliance
with the Combined Code's internal control suggestions achieves the same basic
goal of quality and timeliness of disclosure as the SEC's interpretation of
disclosure controls and procedures.
133. See id. at 69 (explaining that many companies also comply with the Code's provisions because
investors may not agree with the justifications for deviating from the Code's provisions).
134. Id.
135. See COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 124, § D.2, available at www.ecgi.
de/codes.country-documents/uk/combined code.pdf (establishing basic principles of corporate governance). The
review should cover all controls, including financial, operational and compliance controls, and risk management. Id.
136. INTERNAL CONTROL, supra note 125, at 4, available at www.ecgi.de/codes/countrydocuments/
uk/tumbull.pdf (providing general guidelines of how to comply with the Combined Code).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See discussion supra Part II.B.l (explaining the difference between internal controls and disclosure
controls and procedures).
140. Id.
141. See INTERNAL CONTROL, supra note 125, at 4, available at www.ecgi.de/codes/countrydocuments/
uk/turnbull.pdf (explaining in paragraphs 10 through 12 the elements of internal controls). Those elements
include timeliness, quality, and financial aspects of reporting. Id.
142. See id. at paras. 20-24 (listing the essential elements of a sound internal control system). Paragraphs
25 to 34 detail the procedures that should be utilized when performing a review of the effectiveness of these
controls. Id.
143. See id. at 7 (citing financial considerations that should be included as well).
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Sections of the Combined Code also address SEC concerns about an
executive's duty to participate in the disclosure procedure. Sections 16 through
18 of the report explain that it is the role of the company's directors to design,
maintain, review, and implement a system of internal controls.' 44 For example,
the report provides that the board of directors should formulate the internal
controls policies while management implements and maintains the policies in
whatever form the company chooses. 45 This practice parallels the SEC's
discussion of executive certification of disclosure controls and procedures.' 46 The
SEC only imposed the certification requirement because it wants executives to
participate in the design and implementation of disclosure procedures. 47 That
goal is accomplished under the Combined Code because the Code requires the
board of directors and management to design and maintain such procedures.1
In addition to the Combined Code, the United Kingdom maintains certain
statutory requirements. The Companies Act of 1985 is the main source of
corporate law, and it applies to all companies incorporated in England and Wales
whether listed on the London Stock Exchange or not.' 49 The Combined Code is
relevant because several provisions parallel portions of section 302. For example,
this Act requires that a company's annual accounts give a true and fair view of
the state of affairs of the company at the end of each financial year.'-° This
section is not unlike the financial reporting requirements of section 302 dealing
with fair presentation. 5' Furthermore, the Act provides that the board of directors
must approve the company's accounts and that the name of each person signing
the accounts must be listed.5 2 If the board approves annual accounts that do not
comply with the requirements of the Act, every director of the company who is a
party to the approval and knows that the accounts do not comply or is reckless as
to whether the account complies may be guilty of an offense5 3 and liable for a
144. See id. at paras. 16-18 (suggesting the board take into account appropriate policies to assure that the
system is functioning correctly in order to reduce the company's risk).
145. Id.
146. See discussion supra Pan II.B (discussing SEC concerns that the certification requirement was
being imposed to force executives to participate in the process and boost investor confidence in management).
147. Id.
148. See INTERNAL CONTROL, supra note 125, at 6, available at www.ecgi.de/codes/countrydocuments/
uk/tumbull.pdf (emphasizing that the board is responsible for establishing appropriate policies and seeking
regular assurance that the system functions effectively).
149. See Letter from Peter Maynard, Group Legal Services Director, Prudential plc. to Jonathan Katz,
Secretary, Securities Exchange Commission 2 (Aug. 19, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/
pmaynardl.htm [hereinafter Maynard Letter] (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (explaining briefly
what is required under the Companies Act).
150. Id.
151. See discussion supra Part II.B.I (discussing reporting requirements under the fair presentation
clause of § 302). The discussion also addresses the SEC's view that foreign companies using International
Accounting Standards should still be able to address fair presentation adequately because of the interpretation
attached to the term. Id.
152. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 234 (Eng.).
153. Id.
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fine. m There is an exhaustive list of over two hundred offenses and penalties if
the company fails to comply with any portion of the directors' report.
55
In addition to the Companies Act, other penalties are available and may be
imposed under U.K. law. The Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000
provides that the U.K. Listing Authority may fine or publicly censure any
director who was knowingly involved in any breach of the London Stock
Exchange's listing rules."' Specifically, U.K. listing rule 16.2 requires a company
to ensure that its directors take full responsibility, collectively and individually,
for the company's compliance with the listing rules. 5 7 The censure provisions of
this Act supplement the penalties that may be imposed under the Companies Act
if directors fail to act responsibly. These provisions, like section 906 of Sarbanes-
Oxley, are designed to pressure executives to be truthful and disclose all material
information to investors.
British companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are bound to comply
not only with the statutory requirements of the Companies Act, but also with those
of the Combined Code. The Turnbull Report's analysis of the Combined Code
illustrates that its provisions overlap, if not parallel, section 302 requirements as
interpreted by the SEC. Imposing the requirements of section 302 on British
companies would require those issuers to comply with two systems of disclosure
that are essentially the same. If the U.K. system achieves the same policy goals of
heightening disclosure and enhancing investor protection, forcing those issuers to
shoulder the expense of modifying its procedures to effectively comply with both
systems is a heavy burden. 8
B. Germany: Corporate Governance and Section 302
For German companies, where the laws of its jurisdiction do not closely
parallel the U.S. system, compliance may impose an even heavier burden than
those companies in systems like the United Kingdom. For this reason, German
companies have been some of the most vocal opponents to the SEC rules.'59 The
argument from German companies has focused on differences in corporate
structure.160 German companies maintain a two-tiered board structure comprised
154. See generally id. (providing for over 200 offenses and their corresponding punishments).
155. Id.
156. See Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, (2001) S1 2957, § II (Eng.) (providing examples of
the many censure sections contained in the Act).
157. See Maynard Letter, supra note 149, at 2, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/
pmaynardl.htm (reiterating that under the listing rules a company must take all reasonable care to ensure that
none of the information provided is misleading, false or deceptive, making it subject to various penalties).
158. See Michael Hughes, Some Devil in the Detail: Businesses Could Be Underestimating Their
Responsibilities on the Need for Internal Controls Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, FtN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2003, at
2 (reporting that the review of internal control procedures is actually quite burdensome for U.K companies).
159. See Landler, supra note 27 (reporting that German companies are reconsidering whether to list in
New York).
160. See Letter from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, Securities
Exchange Commission (Aug. 19, 2002), at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/clearyl.htm [hereinafter
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of a management board and a supervisory board. 16 This is very different from the
U.S. system where the CEO is perceived as being the head of the corporation.'62
Under German law, the management board is responsible for managing the
business and its members are jointly accountable. 63 It is the Board's role to lead
the company and perform the day-to-day decision-making.' The supervisory
board appoints, supervises and advises the members of the management board.' 6'
The supervisory board has no managerial function, however, it performs the
important role of serving as a check on the power of the management board
TM
According to opponents of the SEC rules, the differences in management
structure make compliance difficult. Opponents argue that the management board
more closely resembles a U.S. company's board of directors and there are no
members that fit the U.S. model of a CEO and CFO. 67 However, there are
indications that German companies are willing to comply with section 302
despite potential differences in the corporate structure. Siemens, a U.S. listed
German corporation, recently filed its Form 20-F and had it signed on behalf of
the company's chief executive and financial director.' 6' Theodor Baums, a
leading German Scholar, suggested that the initial concern surrounding section
302 was that it would contradict the German principle of collective
responsibility.'6 According to Mr. Baums, in practice there does not appear to be
as much conflict as Siemens recently demonstrated.'70 Thus, it appears that the
two-tiered board system is not a major obstacle to compliance with section 302.
Cleary Letter] (copy on file with Transnational Lawyer) (arguing that the United States should defer to German
law because some of Sarbanes-Oxley is inconsistent with German law).
161. Id.
162. See id. at 2 (arguing that the focus of the rules is on the CEO and CFO as the ultimate stewards of
disclosure procedures). According to opponents, this particular methodology is not how German corporations
function. Id
163. See GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, Feb. 26, 2002, at 1, available at www.ecgi.de/
codes.country.documents/germany/corgovendfassunge.pdf [hereinafter CROMME CODE] (copy on file with
The Transnational Lawyer).
164. See Gregory & Simmelkjaer, supra note 123, at 45, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm•/
internalmarket/en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-rpten.htm (citing the Berlin Initiative Code
Thesis 6). The report also explains the differences in two-tiered systems across Europe. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Cleary Letter, supra note 160, at 2, at www.sec.gov/rules/proposedls72102/clearyl.htm
(arguing that the German Stock Corporation Act imposes duties on all the members of the management board,
and it would be inappropriate to require specific members of the management board to shoulder the
responsibility of potential criminal liability).
168. Bertrand Benoit, German Companies Upbeat on U.S. Rules, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 27, 2002,
at 27 (reporting that Siemens' position is contrary to the position taken by Germany's main industrial
federation). According to Siemens, both de-listing and breaking German law are out of the question. Id.
Siemens is confident that a compromise can eventually be reached. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (noting that Siemens' decision to file Form 20-F set a precedent that would make it difficult for
other German companies to argue against Sarbanes-Oxley in coming years).
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The real difficulty between U.S. and German law is that section 302(a)(5)
requires the executive to report on internal controls to an audit committee that is
independent according to U.S. standards. 7' However, German management
boards do not have independent members. The role independent members of
the audit committee perform in the U.S. system is instead within the functions of
the German supervisory board.' Accordingly, without some concessions, it
appears that it would be impossible for an executive to certify that all the
necessary disclosures have been made to the issuers audit committee because
compliance with section 302 would require a company to violate German law.
German companies should not be expected to violate their own law to comply
with the requirements of section 302, and the SEC must take this conflict into
consideration in adopting an exemption policy.
IV. STRUGGLE FOR EXEMPTIONS: THE EQUIVALENCE TEST
International concerns about the application of section 302 to foreign private
issuers should be addressed by the SEC through the adoption of an exemption
policy that parallels the Commission's tradition of deference to foreign laws and
regulations in the area of internal domestic corporate law. 74 If the SEC fails to
grant provision specific exemptions to foreign issuers, it could result in
companies deciding not to list their stock on the U.S. national exchanges. 75 This
could prove disastrous for the United States. In 2001, the total worldwide market
capitalization of non-U.S. companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange
was $4.9 trillion. 176 European stocks accounted for over thirty-eight percent of all
non-U.S. trading. 7
In recent months, the London Stock Exchange has been aggressively
exploiting international concerns surrounding Sarbanes-Oxley by highlighting
troublesome areas and encouraging companies to list in London rather than in
171. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2003) (indicating that § 302(a)(5)
requires that the certifying officer disclose information to the issuer's auditors and the audit committee); see
also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002) (mandating that audit committee members are
supposed to be independent as defined by § 301). To be considered independent, a member of the audit
committee cannot be a member of any other board or committee. Id. In addition, the members cannot be paid
for any other work done for the issuer. Id.
172. Cleary Letter, supra note 160, at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/cleary I.htm.
173. Id.
174. See Maynard Letter, supra note 149, at 1, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/pmay
nardl.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (noting the SEC's
traditional deferential policy toward foreign laws).
175. See Andrew Jack & Andrei Postelnicu, Russian Group to Switch to U.K. Listing, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
3, 2003, at 28 (noting that Uralsvyazinform, a Russian telecommunications company, is likely to switch its
international listing from New York to London). The company cites the rising cost of listing in New York
because of Sarbanes-Oxley as its reason for considering London. Id.
176. See New York Stock Exchange, International Information, available at www.nyse.com/pdfs/
2001_factbook_07.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (copy on file with Transnational Lawyer) (noting that 174
European companies combined for a market capitalization of $3.4 trillion).
177. Id. at 65.
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New York." Asian multinationals and European Technology firms are among
the first to consider a London-only listing and are prepared to forego a New York
listing.'79 Further aggravating the situation, the recent SEC proposal of a listing
ban of companies failing to meet the audit committee requirements is likely to
increase frustration for those foreign issuers that cannot meet the audit committee
requirements.s° The New York Stock Exchange is so alarmed about the impact
Sarbanes-Oxley will have on foreign listings that its chairman has been pressing
for exemptions.'' The concern is that the recent trend toward moving away from
U.S. markets will not be temporary and companies will continue to choose other
stock exchanges over New York.'u The chairman of the London Stock Exchange,
Mr. Cruickshank, believes that many companies find the U.S. capital markets to
be too domestic and unwilling to work with foreign issuers."' A recent example
is the Benfield Group, a U.K. corporation, who announced that it is listing on the
London Exchange for its initial public offering rather than the New York
Exchange because of the uncertain environment created by the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley.' 4 The heightened disclosure requirements and tough criminal
penalties created by the Act place a burden on many foreign private issuers,
prompting them to seek alternative markets for their shares. It is in the United
States' best interests to explore alternatives to requiring compliance with section
302.
A. The Equivalence Test: A Balancing of Factors
One approach to granting exemptions is the adoption of the Equivalence
Test. This test is a balancing approach that gives the SEC discretion in granting
exemptions based on three major considerations: overlapping requirements, the
nature and character of conflicting requirements, and the extent of the burden on
the issuer. This balancing approach will allow the SEC to consider whether a
foreign issuer is providing acceptable levels of disclosure and maintaining
adequate internal control procedures. Once the SEC has determined that an issuer
178. Lenore Taylor London, Sarbanes-Oxley Gives UK an Edge, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Dec. 24, 2002, at 13
(stating that the London Stock Exchange is encouraging Australian companies to list in London rather than in
New York).
179. Vincent Boland & Andrei Postelnicu, NYSE Fears Loss of Foreign Listings, FIN. TIMES (London),
Dec. 5, 2002, at 16.
180. Vincent Boland, SEC to Ponder Listing Ban Idea, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 2, 2003, at 13
(reporting that such a move would have a massive impact on the ability of foreign companies to list their
securities on the U.S. exchanges).
181. Boland & Postelnicu, supra note 179, at 16 (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley has created an unattractive
environment in the United States).
182. Vincent Boland & Andrei Postelnicu, LSE Hopes to Take Business from New York, FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 5, 2002, at 21 (reiterating that the NYSE is concerned that if the SEC does not grant
exemptions, the London Stock Exchange will pull business from New York).
183. Id.
184. Andrew Bolger, Benfleld Chooses London for IPO, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 29, 2002, at 24
(stating that Benfield Group is a U.K.-based reinsurance broker). Benfield's choice to list in London rather than
in New York was motivated by the cost and uncertainty caused by regulatory changes in the United States. Id.
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provides adequate levels of disclosure when balanced with these three
considerations, an issuer should expect the SEC to grant an exemption from strict
compliance with section 302.
The first consideration is the extent the issuer's domestic laws overlap with
the requirements of section 302. To satisfy this prong, an issuer must be able to
demonstrate that its country's domestic laws and codes either mirror or are
substantially similar to the requirements or policies of section 302. An issuer can
demonstrate similarities in substantive law by proving that its jurisdiction
requires, for example, procedures for maintaining internal controls and executive
accountability. An example of a jurisdiction that has overlapping requirements is
the United Kingdom."' However, merely stating that a country's corporate
governance code requires the maintenance of internal controls may not be
sufficient,' 6 especially in those countries where the corporate governance codes
and laws provide for only minimal disclosure.'87 For the Commission to fully
consider an exemption request, a company should provide a statement of how its
internal control procedures function. Evaluation of this statement will allow the
SEC to consider whether the company's internal controls are sufficiently similar
to what section 302 contemplates.
Second, the SEC should consider whether certain provisions of section 302
materially conflict with a jurisdiction's laws or practices. Section 302 is
predicated on an American management structure that may be inapposite in other
countries. " However, the provisions must materially conflict, making compliance
impossible or extremely difficult. For example, it would be impossible for German
companies to certify that it has reported on its internal controls to an independent
audit committee as required by section 302 because it would violate German
law. 89 Situations such as this create real issues for foreign issuers and are
sufficiently material.
Criminal liability for any false certification raises concerns as well. There
exists the potential for criminal liability in both the United States and an issuer's
185. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the overlapping requirements of U.K. companies). This
is a good example of the type of information that an issuer should demonstrate to the SEC. Id.
186. See Gregory & Simmelkjaer, supra note 123, at 68, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internalmarket/en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-rpt.en.htm (noting that general principles of
corporate governance is not a "one size fits all" situation). Companies apply principles of corporate governance
according to the company's size, culture, organization, and many other factors. Id. Many of these principles are
not mandatory, but are merely a supplement to various jurisdictions' company and securities laws and stock
exchange listing rules. Id. Many of the laws require only minimum levels of disclosure and rely on the issuer to
provide additional information. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Cleary Letter, supra note 160, at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/clearyl.htm (noting that
the certification requirement focuses on the CEO and CFO as the persons ultimately responsible for internal
controls, whereas for companies that maintain a two-tier system the counterpart to those U.S. roles may not
exist).
189. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the role of the German supervisory board for auditing duties
and German conflicts with § 302); see also Gregory & Simmelkjaer, supra note 123, at 44, available at
http:/www.europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-market/en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-rpt-en.htm (noting those
countries that maintain a two-tiered system).
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• • • 190jurisdiction. However, strong penalties for corporate irresponsibility was an
important addition to Sarbanes-Oxley.' 9' Thus, an issuer should be able to
demonstrate that its country has strong penalties for false statements and that the
issuer would be liable in both jurisdictions for the same offence.
Finally, the SEC should consider the burdens that compliance with section
302 places on an issuer. The most common burden is the cost of complying with
Sarbanes-Oxley. The uncertainty surrounding the application and compliance
with new corporate governance and accountancy standards has the potential to
send legal fees through the ceiling.'9 Other costs may be associated with the
restructuring of a company's reporting process. 93 Management will have to
engage in a rigorous evaluation of existing procedures, and then move on to
implementing new procedures.' 94 This will most likely entail a complete overhaul
of the financial controls, which then must be communicated throughout the
business and properly documented.' 95 The cost implications for large multinationals
are boundless and may force an issuer to reconsider its New York listing.'9 In
order to accommodate foreign issuers without sacrificing investor protection, the
SEC must seriously consider granting exemptions or run the risk of forcing
foreign issuers to forego a New York listing.
B. Policy Rationale
The Equivalence Test is based upon the rationale that exemptions would only
be granted if the laws of a foreign jurisdiction when combined with the issuer's
own actions advance similar public policy goals to those in section 302.' 9 The
190. See Knechtle Letter, supra note 74, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/aknechtlel.htm
(noting that it is possible that one could be liable under both U.S. and Swiss law for the same behavior).
Arguing that holding a person liable twice for the same offense violates settled principles of international law.
Id.
191. See BENNErT & ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 9-10, available at www.cov.com/publications/
31 I.pdf (noting that after the collapse of Enron, investor outrage prompted a renewed effort to try executive
certification with appropriate penalties as a means to ensure that companies do not make false statements).
Former SEC Chairman Pitt stated that he was outraged after WorldCom made a $4 billion restatement and was
determined to ensure that investors' financial statements are reliable. Id. at 11-12.
192. See Bolger, supra note 184, at 24 (citing the Benfield Group's concerns that the new regulatory
environment would have inevitable cost implications); see also discussion supra Part II.B-C (discussing the
requirements of the new rules and the uncertainty surrounding the application of § 906). See generally Richard
A. Rosen & Daniel J. Kramer, Litigation Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: An Analysis of the Key Issues,
SH097 ALI-ABA 115 (Dec. 5, 2002) (discussing the Act's impact on litigation).
193. See Hughes, supra note 158, at 2 (reporting that the review of internal control procedures is
actually quite burdensome for U.K companies).
194. Id.
195. Id.; see also Jonathan Peterson, Companies Blazing a Paper Trail to Comply with New SEC Rules;
Mandate to Certify Financial Data Shakes up Longtime Business Practices at Many Firms, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
24, 2003, at BI (emphasizing that firms do not agree with the SEC's estimate that the increased disclosure
requirements would add five hours of company time each quarter). Firms estimate that the time required is at
least one hundred times larger than the SEC's estimated time. Id.
196. See Hughes, supra note 158, at 2 (explaining that auditors for these large businesses will want to
meticulously review all the company's procedures, translating into increased costs).
197. See Maynard Letter, supra note 149, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/ pmaynardl.htm
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ultimate goal in using an Equivalence Test would be to avoid imposing the
requirements of section 302 when doing so would clearly require a foreign issuer
to comply with unnecessarily overlapping or conflicting and burdensome
S198
requirements.
Exemptions based on an Equivalence Test should be issuer specific.
Exemptions should not be granted to all companies in a specific foreign
jurisdiction because companies within a jurisdiction may have different levels of
disclosure if the codes provide for minimal disclosure and rely on the issuer to
volunteer any additional information. For example, the London Stock
Exchange operates on a comply or explain basis with regard to the corporate
governance provisions of the Combined Code.2°°
Furthermore, the burden should be placed on the issuer to demonstrate that it
should be granted an exemption. Despite a seventy-seven percent spending
increase for the SEC, the Commission is struggling to maintain an adequate staff
in its enforcement and compliance divisions and the Commission could not
reasonably be expected to seek out candidates for exemptions or perform
extensive research.' Placing the burden on a foreign entity to demonstrate that it
meets any requirements for special treatment has been applied in other areas of
the law and is not a new concept 29 Thus, the commission should take into
consideration the Equivalence Test and its policy rtionale to immediately grant
relief to foreign issuers before they choose to separate themselves from the U.S.
markets.
V. CONCLUSION
Requiring foreign issuers to comply with the new regulations may cause
problems because these regulations are either overlapping or conflicting and may
place a heavy financial burden on the issuer to adopt new procedures to ensure
compliance. The SEC has throughout its history traditionally accommodated
foreign issuers within the area of internal corporate governance. After the
(establishing the basic proposition that if a finding can be made that a foreign private issuer's home jurisdiction
has safeguards that are sufficiently similar from a public policy perspective to those advanced in § 302, the
home country's safeguards should be considered sufficient for purposes of § 302). Additionally, the United
States should provide similar relief from criminal liability under § 906. Id.
198. See id. (arguing that it would not prove useful to compel U.S.-listed British companies to satisfy
differently worded but overlapping tests). To do so would only foster confusion and place an additional burden
on the issuer. Id.
199. See Gregory & Simmelkjaer, supra note 123, at 68-69, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm.
/internal-market/en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-rpt-en.htm (noting that the jurisdictions relying
on additional voluntary disclosure do so because it is believed that the marketplace will encourage disclosure).
The argument is that a company will appear less attractive to investors if it fails to provide additional disclosure.
Id.
200. See id. at 69-70 (explaining that the companies listed on the London Stock Exchange must comply
with the Combined Code or explain which provisions have not been complied with and why).
201. See Stephen Labaton, In Stormy Time, SEC Is Facing Deeper Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002,
at I (explaining that budget and staffing difficulties threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the SEC).
202. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(3)(a) (2001) (requiring bank holding companies to provide all of the
necessary information for special treatment).
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collapse of Enron and WorldCom, the political and social fallout from massive
corporate irresponsibility may have forced the SEC to abandon its traditional
deference to foreign laws. The SEC is now realizing that abandonment of its
deferential policies has led the international business community to reconsider
listing their securities on the New York Stock Exchange. Foreign securities
constitute a large portion of the stocks traded in the United States, and the SEC
should consider granting foreign issuers exemptions to maintain the continued
vitality of foreign trading in the United States. The United Kingdom and
Germany are just two examples of jurisdictions where foreign issuers find
compliance with section 302 problematic. Thus, the SEC should adopt an
Equivalence Test that takes into consideration the level of investor protection
provided by a foreign jurisdiction's laws. This can be achieved by examining any
overlapping or conflicting requirements with section 302 and the extent of the
compliance burden on the foreign issuer. This balancing approach should provide
the SEC with a reasonable and principled approach to granting exemptions to
foreign issuers.

